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 Cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky eventually (and unexpectedly) made 
their mark on the economics world by challenging 
rational choice theory, a theory of classical economics 
that posits rationality as a bedrock value of market 
behavior. The associated experiments were simple—
indeed, many seem like modified versions of brain-
teasers or parlor games—but they nonetheless changed 
economists’ assumptions of the rationality of actors in 
markets, eventually earning Kahneman and Tversky a 
2002 Nobel Prize in Economics. Their key insight was 
that actual humans, compared to rational actors, are 
risk averse, and threats of risk (in the form of losing 
money, say) are twice as painful as the equivalent gain 
would be pleasurable (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). 
Hypothetical rational actors of economic theory are, 
therefore, an inaccurate representation of how markets 
will actually react to any number of phenomena that 
involve risk.  
 Media literacy education is generally concerned 
not with rational decision-making in markets, but with 
the development of critical thinking. Critical thinking is, 
reductively, the ability to challenge our assumptions and 
ask questions about the interplay of content and context. 
In the words of a group of prominent English educators, 
in critical thinking, “word-reality relationships must 
be challenged in every instance” (Alsup, Emig, 
Pradl, Remmel, and Yagelski 2006, 289). However, 
like rational actors, it is possible that critical thinkers 
function more as a hypothetical category of individuals 
with little relation to the messy, inconsistent humans 
who are said to be thinking critically. In Thinking, Fast 
and Slow, an artful synthesis of over three decades of 
cognitive experiments, Kahneman (2011) reveals some 
of the limits of conscious mindfulness and deliberative 
thought on changing ingrained thinking, beliefs, and 
behaviors. 
 Ultimately, Kahneman suggests, we are far 
better at figuring out mistakes in others than in being 
critical about our own beliefs and choices. It is through 
no particular fault of ideology or ignorance; it is simply 
a constant and unavoidable feature of how we think. It 
would be wrong, though, to say that teaching critical 
thinking is a wholly futile endeavor, or that humans are 
solely driven by belief, intuition, and impulse. More 
accurately, what we call “critical thinking” is really only 
half of the story of how we operate cognitively on a 
day-to-day basis. 
 Critical thinking requires effortful cognitive 
work (the kind that makes your pupils dilate and your 
glucose levels drop), and thus falls under the second 
of two figurative systems—plainly named “System 
1” and “System 2”—that comprise human decision-
making and psychology (21). System 1, our intuitive 
and automatic thought processes, makes up the 
majority of our thoughts and actions. Far from being 
merely “uncritical,” System 1 is actually essential, and 
usually good enough for interacting in the world: “its 
models of familiar situations are accurate, its short-
term predictions are usually accurate as well, and its 
initial reactions to challenges are swift and generally 
appropriate” (25). We depend on intuitive, automatic 
processes when we move, when we drive a car, or when 
we filter information in our aural or visual environment 
to focus. By contrast, System 2 only enters the picture 
when we are in any situation that requires effortful 
cognitive work, like solving a math equation, writing an 
essay, or analyzing a media text.
 Problems for critical thinking—including 
media literacy key concepts like understanding diverse 
perspectives, identifying omissions, or determining 
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values and points of view—arise when System 1 
and System 2 begin to interact. A thorough catalog 
of these problems are presented in the first half of 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, in which Kahneman carefully 
and methodically sets out a general framework for 
understanding how the mind can succeed and fail when 
critical thinking is most important. The key insight in 
this half of the book is that people tend naturally toward 
cognitive ease—using the least amount of energy 
needed to perform a cognitive task. This has nothing 
to do with intelligence, education, or innate savvy. It is, 
according to Kahneman, simply part of how the human 
mind works. 
 Because we tend toward cognitive ease, we rely 
on necessary shortcuts to lighten the burden of effortful 
thought. We rely on associative memory, so that we are 
not reinventing our way of thinking with every new 
problem. We tend to rely on accepted norms (what 
others are doing or have done) and are susceptible to 
many forms of subconscious priming. We are naturally 
inclined to identify agents and causes of phenomena, 
even when no such cause is responsible. We tend to 
eliminate our sense of conscious doubt whenever 
possible. And we do a lot of post hoc justification 
through which our supposedly critical System 2 
becomes “an endorser rather than an enforcer” (103), 
using the language of rationality to justify what was 
more accurately an intuitive response. 
 Our minds are very good, in fact, at justifying our 
instinctive System 1 responses with plausible System 2 
rationalizations. Again, this has nothing necessarily to 
do with how smart or clever we are, or even how much 
information about a subject we have at hand. Kahneman 
claims that we substitute questions we can answer more 
easily with the questions it may be necessary for us to 
answer (for instance, one might respond to a question 
about political policy by answering the more basic 
question, “Do I like this politician?”). Often, our visceral 
likes and dislikes determine beliefs that we present 
in rational language, via a common device called the 
affect heuristic, “in which people make judgments and 
decisions by consulting their emotions” (139). 
 Kahneman uses a series of studies on the affect 
heuristic to single out how media representations in 
news play on fears, noting that negative framing of 
an event can change our perception of reality: “The 
world in our heads is not a precise replica of our reality; 
our expectations about the frequency of events are 
distorted by the prevalence and emotional intensity 
of the messages to which we are exposed” (139). 
He also shares results from an experiment in which 
messages “extolling the benefits of a technology also 
changed [subjects’] beliefs about its risks” (140). When 
people liked a particular technology or read a positive 
evaluation of it, they downplayed or ignored its risks; 
when they thought it was risky, they saw little benefit of 
the technology. The outcome applied to both laypeople 
and experts (in this study, representatives of the British 
Toxicology Society). 
 If the ultimate goal of media literacy education 
is to create the next generation of critical thinkers 
(NAMLE 2007), it would be wise to reflect on the 
ways that our fast-thinking System 1 and slow-thinking 
System 2, in concert, inevitably lead us to a wide 
variety of common and predictable errors, distortions, 
and rationalizations that can override critical thinking, 
skepticism, and tolerance for ambiguity. One general 
rule that Kahneman provides for those who would 
seek to improve their capacity to make sound decisions 
and judgments is, “little can be achieved without 
considerable effort” (417). Beliefs are stubborn, and 
easily become part of the fabric of System 1. This 
is, in part, the basis for the powerful “Solutions Too 
Easy” button on the Media Literacy Remote Control 
developed by Hobbs (2011)—a button that is, by 
Kahneman’s logic, easier to apply to media and ideas 
we find distasteful or risky than to ourselves. Even 
with considerable effort in his life’s work, Kahneman 
reflects bluntly, “I have made much more progress in 
recognizing the errors of others than my own” (417).
 Kahneman seems ambivalent on the role 
of education to increase mindfulness and System 
2-facilitated questioning in matters of knowledge 
that is connected to System 1. He describes a study 
conducted by Nisbett and Borgida that showed that 
students given explicit instruction in statistical human 
behavior were no better able to predict the likelihood 
of a person they saw in a video to exhibit that statistic 
than students without the instruction. However, a third 
group of students defied this trend when they saw the 
videos but were told afterward that the individuals on 
video exhibited a counter-intuitive trait. In the third 
case, students accurately gauged the correct statistic in 
the general population (which they had not yet been 
told), because surprise shook them out of their intuitive 
reaction. 
 The problem, Kahneman explains, is as follows: 
People who are taught surprising statistical facts 
about human behavior may be impressed to the 
point of telling their friends about what they 
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have heard, but this does not mean that their 
understanding of the world has really changed. 
The test of learning psychology is whether your 
understanding of situations you encounter has 
changed, not whether you have learned a new 
fact… even compelling causal statistics will not 
change long-held beliefs or beliefs rooted in 
personal experience. (174)
Instead, he argues:
[S]urprising individual cases have a powerful 
impact and are a more effective tool for teaching 
psychology because the incongruity must be 
resolved and embedded in a causal story… You 
are more likely to learn something by finding 
surprises in your own behavior than by hearing 
surprising facts about people in general. (174)
 If critical thinking is, in part, the constant 
practice of reflective thinking, understanding of diverse 
perspectives, and questioning assumptions and beliefs 
based on new experience and new information, then it 
seems that experience—specifically, the experiential 
impact of applying surprising or counter-intuitive 
information about the world to our own lives—is 
important for sustaining new beliefs. At the same time, 
sometimes information does not, in itself, enact lasting 
change. I have seen students who have been through 
media literacy programs complain about how their 
new knowledge of media construction has “ruined” 
television, movies, or video games. Have they had 
personal experiences that cannot be untaught? Or is 
that “ruination” secretly a sign of failure—of students 
whose new information does not sync up with their 
experiences of getting pleasure from media they use 
and experience?
 In Kahneman’s example of teaching psychology, 
knowing and feeling are not always the same—we 
can know many things that, in application, we will 
strategically not-know in order to appease our intuitive 
reaction. There seems to be a clear connection to 
media literacy education here, which, in teaching the 
processes of media constructedness, sometimes fails to 
reach learners and educators where it matters most—in 
their own lives, beliefs, and behaviors. Media literacy 
education does a disservice to students when educators 
believe that they are in a unique category of critical 
thinker or media literate without being able to challenge 
their own lines of thinking and belief. According to 
Kahneman, keeping intuition and cognitive effort in 
balance is not only a continuing struggle, but also is most 
difficult for us when we feel most certain about our own 
correctness. This is a particularly vexing issue in the 
realm of information credibility, where most appeals to 
authority, reliability, and thoroughness taught as critical 
thinking may simply have the gloss of System 2 validity 
that appeals specifically to our intuitive beliefs. This 
gloss is part of the anxiety around Pariser’s (2012) so-
called filter bubble in which websites use algorithms to 
present information we already agree with. To my mind, 
Kahneman’s studies take this line of thought a step 
further: our minds are also their own filter bubbles that 
are merely amplified by intuitive (System 1-friendly?) 
information technologies.  
 Thinking, Fast and Slow raises a great number 
of thorny questions about the relationship between 
information and persuasion. Persuasive techniques—
those techniques that best apply to System 1, or to 
System 1 with the post hoc rationalization of System 
2—are powerful motivators for behavioral change. 
By contrast, as Kahneman pithily claims, “correcting 
your intuitions may complicate your life” (192). 
Critical thinking, perhaps especially about those 
things which give us most pleasure, requires effort and 
the counterintuitive propensity to maintain doubt in 
exactly the situations our minds do the most they can to 
minimize doubt. It is an uphill battle for everyone.
 That said, there are reasons why Kahneman’s 
description of this uphill battle is useful, if challenging, 
for developing and supporting optimal media literacy 
education through the development of inquiry 
and critical thinking in teachers and in students. 
Kahneman’s work refuses easy solutions, and as such 
is a much better resource for asking questions than it 
is for supplying answers. This makes Thinking, Fast 
and Slow a nice contrast to the more anecdotal Blink 
by Malcolm Gladwell (2005) and the more polemical 
Everything Is Obvious (Once You Already Know the 
Answer) by Duncan Watts (2011). All three texts are 
valuable reading for media literacy educators who seek 
a better understanding of the opportunities and limits 
of reflective thinking. They are humbling reminders 
that critical thinking only works when we view it as an 
imperfect, iterative process that fails precisely when we 
most strongly believe it has been mastered. 
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